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REPORTS OF CASES 
DETERMINED IN 
THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
[Sac. No. 5386. In Bank. Apr. 3,1944.] 
C. W. BEELER, Respondent, v. AMERICAN TRUST 
COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant. 
[1] Mortgages - Deeds as Mortgages - Appeal-Conilicting Evi-
dence.-Whether the evidence to show that a deed was in-
tended as a mortgage is clear and convincing is a question 
for the trial court, whose determination on conflicting evidence 
is not reviewable on appeal. 
[2a,2b] Id.-Deeds as Mortgages-Evidence-Sufficiency.-In an 
action to declare a deed to be a mortgage, a finding for. the 
plaintiff grantor was sustained by evidence showing, among 
other things, (1) negotiations resulting. in a refinancing scheme 
with a deed to the creditor bank and a one-year lease carry-
ing a rental equivalent to interest on the loan; (2) the execu-
tion merely to satisfy a title insurance company of an affidavit 
certifying the transaction to be a conveyance; (3) the gran-
tor's retention of possession, specifically' referred to in the 
insurance policy; (4) the inequality between the value of the 
property and the consideration expressed in the conveyance; 
and (5) the subsequent exercise by the grantor of the rights 
of an owner, including the maki~g of improvements and the 
execution, with the consent of the bank, of leases, not sub-
leases. 
[1] See 17 Cal.Jur. 757, 758. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Mortgages, § 57; [2] Mortgages, 
§ 52; [3] Mortgages, § 36; [4] Mortgages, § 35; [5] Mortgages, 
§52(2); [6] Mortgages, §51(1); [7] ContractR §07; 18J Appeal 
and Error, § 118; [9,11] Tender, § 4; [10] Payment, ~ 47, 
U C.2d-1 
(1) 
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[3] Id.-Deeds as Mortgages-Inadequacy of Price.-Proof that 
property is worth $60,000 in exceSs of the $55,000, the recited 
consideration in a deed, is a strong circumstance tending to 
show that the deed was intended as a mortgage. 
[4] Id. _ Deeds as Mortgages - Payment of Interest.-The dis-
parity between the actual rental value of premises and that 
fixed in a lease to the grantor deeding property to a bank, 
together with proof that the amount was fixed at the equiva-
lent of the interest rate on the consideration recited in the 
deed, is a strong circumstance tending to show that the "rent" 
is really an interest payment consistent with the character of 
the transaction as a loan. 
[5] Id.-Deeds as Mortgages - Evidence - Discharge of Debt.-
Where a creditor retained the evidences of indebtedness, not-
withstanding the recordation of a deed from the debtor to 
the creditor purportedly in extinguishment of the debt, the 
creditor's mtries on its records designed to indicate the pay-
ment of the debt are ineffectual to establish, the discharge of 
the debt. 
(6] Id.-Deeds a.s Mortgages-Evidence-Parol Evidence.-An af-
fidavit, accompanying a deed, declaring the transaction to be 
an absolute conveyance, and not a mortgage or security, is not 
conclusive, and does not preclude parol evidence to show the 
character of the transaction. (Disapproving in part PeopZe ell: 
,.et Fo,.d v. 1,.witt, 18 Cal. 117.) 
['1] Oontracts_Oonsideration-promise for Promise.-An agree-
ment by a mortgagee to reduce an indebtedness is supported 
by a consideration where it is one of the reciprocal agree-
ments culminating in the execution of a deed by the debtor 
to the mortgagee. 
[8] Appeal- Presenting Objections - Defenses.-Where lack of 
consideration for an agreement w'as not pleaded in the trial 
court and the case was tried on other issues, the objection 
may not properly be raised for the first time on appeal. 
[9] Tender-EfIect.-While a mortgagee is entitled to reimburse-
ment for payment of an installment of taxes which the mort-
gagor is to pay, the running of interest on the amount paid 
is stopped by the mortgagor's offer of payment made in good 
faith and with ability to perform. (See Civ. Code, § 1485.) 
[3] Value as factor in determining whether deed is mortgage, 
note, 90 A.L.R. 953. See, als,o, 17 Oa1.Jur. 788j 36 Am.Jur. 765. 
[41 See 17 Oa1.Jur~ 786. [61 Parol evidence to show deed to be a mortgage, note, 111 
A.L.R.4-lS. See, also, 17 Oal.Jur. 776, 36 Am.Jur. 760, 
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[10] Payment--Proof -Sufficiency.-In ~ri'· 'aetiori' tot aeclafe1il,{:. 
deed to be a mortgage, a 'finding that arlobligationto reful~ 
burse the mortgagee for an installment of taxes :paidwalf dis- ' 
charged by an assignment by the mortgagor of, a JeaAe, "was " 
supported and was binding upon the" reviewing court where' 
there was testimony as to the agreement, to make, the assign-
ment in payment of the hiterest and taxes, and, the giVing, 
on acceptance of the assignment, of a receipt for all payments 
owed. ',,, . " 'j .," 
[11] Tender-EfIect.-Where a trial court properly find~'ttP'Q~ 'sut~: 
, flcient evidence that an officer of iI. creditor bank'refused to 
negotiate with the debtor without making 'objecfion' 'to ,tli~' 
form of the tender or ability to perform 'the offet'made,'tlie ' 
eourt may properly conclude that further action by the' debto1-
would meet with like rebuff. by the bank, ,and )that'rtheiiin-
debtedness ceased to bear interest from that tUne.~, (See',Ci.,. 
Code, §§ 1496,1501,1504.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the' Superior.;,Cqp.rt"of {~,~. 
hama County. Herbert S. Gans, Judge., Modified and,~-
firmed.' ' "':<','''' ,: 
-, : 1 ; " ~. ; , r ,," 
, Action to have a deed declared a mortgage. Judgplentfor 
plaintiff modified and affirmed. ' ' , , , 
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, Carr & Kennedy and M. B. 
Plant for Appellant. ' 
Morrison, Hohfeld, Foerster, Shuman & Clark and Landels 
& Weigel, as Amici Curiae, on behalf of Appellant. 
Carter, Barrett & Carlton, Daniel S.· Carlton, OliverJ. 
Carter, McGregor & McGregor, Major'McGregor and Dudley 
G. McGregor for Respondent.' ,.'1 
, • ~, '\: 'I 
CURTIS, J.-A rehearing was granted herein topertriit 
additional study of the points involved. The further. con-
sideration consequently given this case has only 'ser'vedtb 
confirm the conclusions heretofore reached, and accordingly, 
the following opinion expresses our sustained views.' :"" ~':~'r 
The defendant, American Trust Company;appeais from>an 
adverse judgment holding that a deed absolute 'in, fotin"was' 
in fact an equitable mortgage. 'The prin<iipalc()nteri.tionpre~ 
sented by the defendant bank as, a basis for a reversaL of ,the 
'\t,'~ i,~li 
! 
4 
BEELER v. AMERICAN TRUST CO. [24 C.2d 
judgment is the familiar claim that the evidence is insufficient 
to justify the conclusion of the trial court. As a related con-
sideration, it is particularly urged that a verified affidavit 
of the grantor declaring the contemporaneously executed deed 
to be an absolute conveyance of the property, and not in-
tended as a mortgage, is a conclusive expression of the under-
standing between the parties and precludes the admissibility 
of parol evidence to the contrary. 
The facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction 
out of which this controversy arose appear to be substantially 
as follows: Prior to July 28, 1937, Henry Weiss owned a 
large tract of land in Tehama County subject to a deed of 
trust dated March 21, 1933, running in favor of the Ameri-
can Trust Company to secure two promissory notes for the 
aggregate sum of $74,400 and bearing interest at the rate 
of 5% per cent per annum. Weiss was unable to make the 
stipulated payments and on October 5, 1936, he was served 
with a notice of default announcing the bank's election to 
proceed with the sale of this ranch property. At the request 
of Weiss the foreclosure proceedings were delayed to give him 
an opportunity to try to fine.. a purchaser. In June, 1937, 
Weiss introduced C. W. Beeler to the officers of the bank 
interested in this matter, and the parties thereupon discussed 
various propositions looking toward a discount of the debt 
and its reduction to a satisfactory figure incident to Beeler's 
purchase of the property. Finally, Mr. Hammond, an assis-
tant vice-president of the bank, agreed to accept $55,000 in 
cash if that sum were paid within the next few weeks. OIl 
July 28, 1937, Weiss conveyed the ranch to Beeler, and it 
was expressly provided in the terms of the transfer that 
Beeler assumed and agreed to pay the indebtedness secured 
by the deed of trust. At the same time Weiss exeeuted and 
delivered to Beeler a bill of sale of certain personal property 
on the ranch. 
The financial arrangement contemplated by Beeler as the 
basis for his negotiations with the bank for the early discharge 
of the debt on the property at the discounted figure did not 
materialize, and as of September 1, 1937, no part of the 
$55,000 had been paid. Accordingly, on the last-mentioned 
date the bank served upon both Beeler and Weiss a second 
notice of default. The indebtedness on its original scale had 
then increased to the aggregate sum of $81,000. 
Apr. 1944] BEELER v. AMERICAN TRUST Co. 
[24 O.2d 11 
/) 
Subsequent to said notice and on September 22, 1937, 
Beeler visited the bank for the purpose of negotiating with 
its officers some refinancing plan whereby he might continue 
to retain the ranch and have an extension of time for the' 
payment of the debt as theretofore reduced. The bank's of-; 
ficers refused to carry this property transaction any longer ' 
on the records as a security arrangement, and they therefore 
proposed the following course of procedure: Beeler would 
deed the property to the bank and in return the bank would • 
execute to Beeler a lease of the premises for the period of 
one year at a rental of $3,000 per annum, Beeler to pay all 
taxes and maintenance expense on the ranch and '.to have 
an option to purchase the land at any time during the terni 
of the lease for the sum of $60,000. Beeler accepted this 
proposition and by an absolute deed dated September 27,' 
1937, he conveyed the property to the bank. As an accom-
panying instrument, Beeler executed and 'delivered, to, the" 
bank his verified affidavit, in which he stated that" said deed' 
"is intended to be and is an absolute conveya.nceofthetitle'( 
to said premises to the grantee named therein, and was' not;' 
and is not now intended as a mortgage, trust conveyance or," ' 
security of any kind; that it was the intention of affiant as' 
grantor in said deed to convey, and by said deed this affiant 
did convey to the grantee therein all his right, title arid in~ 
terest absolutely in and to said premises; that possession of 
said premises has been surrendered to the grantee; that in 
the execution and delivery of said deed affiant was not act- ' 
ing under any misapprehension as to the e;fi'ectthereof,and " 
acted freely and voluntarily and was not acting under coer- • 
cion or duress; that the consideration for said dee'dwas and 
is the full cancellation of all debts, obligations; costs and ' 
charges secured by that certain deed of' trust heretofore 
existing on said property, ... arid the reconveyance of said 
property under said deed of trust; ... This affidavit is made ;, 
for the protection and benefit of the grantee in said deed, 
its successors and assigns, ... andparticuhLrly for the bene-
fit of the TITLE INSURANCE AND GUARANTY-COMPANY, which' 
is about to insure the title to said property in reliance 
thereon, . . ." Pursuant to the terms of this affidavit, the 
bank executed a reconveyance under its, trust deed reciting 
that the indebtedness thereby secured had been fully paid. 
, rrr--
:i\' 
I 
',J'. 
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On November 5, 1937, both the deed from Beeler and the 
reeonveyance were dUly recorded. 
As of May 16, 1938, neither installment of the 1937-1938 
taxes on the ranch had been fully paid, and on said men-
tioned day the bank served upon Beeler a notice to pay the 
taxes or quit the premises for failure to comply with the 
terms of the lease. The parties were unable to settle their 
differences on this score and in July, 1938, the bank brought 
. suit. in unlawful detainer seeking Beeler's eviction from the 
property. In the ensuing trial Beeler succe~sfuny main-
tained his. defense on the ground that th~ notice of breach 
given him was defective, and judgment was rendered accord-
ingly in his. favor. ' 
On October 19, 1938, Beeler commenced this action against 
the American Trust Company to have his deed of conveyance 
to the defendant bank declared a mortgage to secure the ante-
cedent debt. In his complaint plaintiff alleged that the bank 
agreed to reduce the outstanding indebtedness against the 
property to the sum of $60,000 to be paid, together with inter-
est at the rate of 5 per cent per annum, within the period 
of one year as provided by the terms of the lease, and that 
the bank accepted the deed of conveyance as a mortgage to 
secure that debt. To this complaint the defendant bank filed 
an answer and cross-complaint, denying the material aver-
ments of the plaintiff's pleading and asserting that the par-
ties intended the deed to be an absolute transfer of title. to 
the property as it in form purported to be, and not a mort-
gage or other security arrangement. With the principal 
controversial issue 'thus defined, the action proceeded to trial, 
and at the conclusion thereof the court adopted findings fa-
vorable to the plaintiff. Judgment was rendered accordingly 
against the defendant bank, determining the plaintiff, C. W. 
Beeler, to be the owner in fee of the property in question sub-
ject to a mortgage lien as security for the payment of the 
following sums: (1) the agreed indebtedness of $60,000, to-
gether with interest at the rate of 5 per cent per annum, 
according to the terms expressed in the lease and option agree-
ment; and (2) the first installment of the 1937-1938 taxes, 
$477.88, with interest from the date of the entry of the decree 
herein. It was further ordered that on receipt of these sums 
within the time limitation specified by the court, the defen-
dant bank should reconvey the property to the plaintiff and 
Apr. 19441 BEELER'll. AMERiCiAN. TRUST Co. 
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execute and deliver to him a release and: ~atisfacti(;n"Of 
lien thus adjudicated. From this judgment' the. 'deferiaant, : 
Amerrean Trust Company, prosecutes thiS appeai. . /i' ... ~ ........  
[1] ,It is without doubt the law, as repeatedly decla~ed:in '!' 
Our decisions, that clear and convincing evidence'i~' required . 
to justify a court in finding that a deed' which:!purpol'ts' to 
convey land absolutely in fee simple was. intended to, be, a . 
mortgage. ' cc That a deed purporting on its face to. convey .. 
the title absolutely may be shown' bY' parol evidence to be 
something else--natnely, a mortgage:-:-is: a strik~n:g exception 
to the general rule, and it has been universanY)h~ld that,4~e 
,character of the instrument cannot. be thus clianged.except 
upon clear and convincing evidence." (W Dods ~~. lemen, 
130 Cal. 200,203 [62 P. 473] ; see, also, Mahoney'v;]Bostwick, 
96 Cal.' 53 [30 P. 1020, 31.Am.St.Rep. 175] ; Sheehan~v. Sul-
livan, 126 Cal. 189 [58 P. 543] ; Emery v. 1Lowe,140 Cal. 379 
[73 P. 981]; Wadleigh v. Phelps, 149 CaL 627 [87 ,P., ,93] ; 
Oouts v. Winston, 153 Cal. 686 [96 P. 357]; Toddv. Todd, 
164 Cal. 255 [128 P. 413] ; Kohn v. Parent, 174 Cal. 570 [163 
P. 1008]; Lockhart v. J. H. McDougall 00., 190 . Cal. 308. 
(212 P. 1]; Oarlson v, Robinson, 7 Cal.2d 235 [60,P.2d426].) '!', 
But whether or not the evidence offered to change. the os-
tensible character of the instrument is clear and, convincing 
is a question for the trial court to decide. (Mahoney. v. Bost-
wick, supraj Todd. v. Todd, suprajLockhart. v. J. H.Mc-
Dougall 00., supraj 17 Cal.Jur. 757, § 59.) In such ca$e, ,as 
in others, the determination of that court in favor. of. either 
party upon conflicting or contradictory evidence is not open 
to review on appeal. (Sherman v. Sandell, 106 Oal. 373 [39 
P. 797J; Locke v. Moulton, 132 Cal. 145 [64P., 87] ; Beckman 
v. Waters, 161 Cal. 581 [119 P. 922] ; 17 Cal.Jur. 758, § 60.) 
As was said in this regard in Wadleigh v. Phelps, supra, at 
page 637, "the appellate court ... will not disturb the finding 
of the trial court to the effect that the deed is a mortgage, 
where there is substantial evidence warranting a clear and 
satisfactory conviction to that effect. All questions as to pre-
ponderance and conflict of evidence, are for the trial court." 
[2a] A review of the record in the light of these rules 
does not establish that the finding declaring the deed in 'ques-
tion to be a mortgage is without sufficient evidentiary support. 
In conStruing the disputed financial arrangement, conced-
edly made as the result of the understanding reached be-
." 
",: 
\~!I ! 
1,'.li; .. : I ': 
,. 
!, 
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tween the plaintiff and certain officers of the defendant bank 
at the aforementioned conference of September 22, 1937, re-
gard must be had at the outset for the parties' course of ne-
gotiations at that meeting relative to some appropriate dis-
position' of the indebtedness secured by the property here 
involved under the outstanding deed of trust. In this con-
nection the plaintiff testified at length at the trial, as the fol-
lowing pertinent excerpts from the record will show: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
"MR. CARTER [plaintiff's attorney]: Q. Mr. Beeler, give 
us the conversation that took place between yourself and the 
representative of the American Trust Company on September 
22, 1937. 
"A. We all went into the little room, the small board of 
directors' meeting room, and sat down. I said, 'I am here 
to make some other arrangement than the present arrange-
ment of paying the indebtedness off in 55,000 dollars cash. 
I find at this time I can't do it. The principal man that I 
had to get financed has been in an accident and had to have 
his arm amputated' and has been in the hospital and he just 
couldn't do anything for me at that time.' I said, 'I want 
the ranch. I want to continue with the ranch. I don't want 
you to foreclose on it like this letter says, but is there some 
other way that we can do something about it Y Is there some 
other arrangement we can make to carry this loan Y' . The 
conversation practically altogether was between Mr. Kennedy 
and myself. He said, 'There is not any way I can say. You 
have got to pay the money. That was the agreement and that 
is what we have got to have.' I said, 'Well, I just can't pay 
it but there must be some other way.' He said, 'That is the 
same old story with this ranch. We just have grief and 
trouble with it. We get half way through a deal and some-
thing blows up and goes wrong; We can't do anything un-
less we get some money.' He said, 'Can't you pay us, some 
money Y Can't you pay us five thousand' dollars on it. We 
want some money on the thing.' I said, 'I need what money 
I have to carry me along in my business and so on.' I again 
insisted, 'Isn't there some way that we can handle this thing 
without you foreclosing on it Y I want to keep the ranch.' 
Finally after some words back and forth Mr. Kennedy said, 
'The only way I can see for you to do it is to deed us the 
property and let us take the title to the property so that we 
.~ 
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can write off· this amount of money and this' discount on it.~ 
I said, 'If you do that will I still get it for the 55,000 dol~ 
lars?' He said, 'No, we should have 60,000 dollars.' lsaid;, 
'Well, if you do that, you ought to reduce the interest froni 
six per cent to five per cent.' As I understood all along it 
had been six per cent. That was agreeable to Mr. Kennedy , 
and we discussed back and forth how it; COuld be done. I 
didn't want to see it that way, but he said, 'That is the only 
way we can do it. It has been grief and trouble and the bank 
examiners say "You have got to get it off the bOOks as a loan 
or foreclose on it or do something about it. " On the one hand 
we can't give you title to the property and give you back 
a mortgage on it and write off the loss we are going' to take 
on it right there. We have got to put it into the real estate 
department. That is the way we have got to do it. 'Then we 
can write off the loss in the real estate department or get a 
new deal later on and get this refinancing over with and we 
will have a chance to look at your property in Paradise.' In 
the conversation I tried to get him to -take property in Para-
dise which we have to reduce the indebtedness down. He 
said, 'r can't do that. I don't know what the' vallie of ,it is.' 
He asked me a lot of questions about it. He said, IWell, if 
you want to do it this way now, and deed us the property and' 
yoU take a lease and an option back on it for a year, we will: 
have time to send somebody baek up and look at the property 
and get an appraisal on it and maybe weean take it in that 
way. If we can't take it in that way, maybe we . can take it 
in as additional security.' I said, 'I don't, want to trade it 
in as additional security. One big ranch is ehough to look'-
after. That is one of the reasons I want to trade 'it. ':rwari1;' 
to get rid of the worry and trOUble of that propertY.' ,,' ,;, 
:': ~ .; '. ',~'. ,". 
"ia. CART~: Q. J~t . : • gi~e th~ substan~e of\vh8:t:*a;rr 
said ,-, ; . .;-;, "::',r. 
"A.. Mr. Kennedy finally said, 'We wllI'.dO au.:t:'''w~·lillf' 
take the deed to the property and give 'you a. lease and' ru{' . 
option back on it and that will give us time to inspect the'"; 
Paradise property and we can carry the deal on tb"at'way': 
until we can get these things done, get 'the property inspected? 
and see if we ean take it in.' I said, 'If that falls down is:: 
there some other way that We can do it?' I said, 'I know you 'i 
generally ,sell properties for a small down payment' and if :1 
In-J\l ". . 
I;; 
: ~:: 
'\' .j" 
. ~; 
,.' 
i}: 
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you could get some money on the ranch, like you just said 
a while ago, what could we do about that' If this falls down 
we can't do it;' He said, 'We have had nothing but grief 
and trouble with that thing and we want to get it off of our 
books. ' I said, 'If these things don't go through, can I pay 
you a payment of five thousand dollars at the end of the 
time or during the time and carry the balance of the loan 
and make my payment Y' He said, 'We want to settle it and 
we will settle it in any kind of a deal at all and if you can 
give us some money that is what we asked you both all alol1~. 
for some money.' The discussion went on. Mr. Kenned~' 
said, 'We don't know you so well. What security can you 
give us ,for this interest and taxes so we will know they are 
being paid" All we have been getting is promises on this 
place for' years.' I said, 'I am making a lease on the grain 
land on ,the bottom for forty-five hundred dollars with Her· 
sChell.Giles at that time.' That is as far as they had gone. 
'I am glad to assign that to you to pay the interest and the 
taxes. ' He said, 'You haven't got it yet. You can't assign 
something you haven't got. ' We talked back and forth about 
that. He said, 'What about the equipment and so on that 
you own 7 Will you give us a . chattel mortgage on that to 
secure the payment of the interest and taxes until you do get 
the Giles lease 7 ' I said, 'Sure I will.' It was left that way." 
"A. I said, 'Is it possible that these negotiations or this 
prospective deal to reduce the mortgage down with the Para-
dise property, if that isn't acceptable to the bank, can I 
make some new arrangement or some arrangement now to 
make a payment on the indebtedness and then continue with 
a new mortgage.' And he said, 'Yes, all we want to do is to 
get some money out of that property. All we have ever had 
is promises.' And I tried to pin Mr. Kennedy down to if he 
would take five thousand dollars and in an off-hand way he 
said, 'Yes, some way. We want,to make some kind of a deal. 
We want to get some money out of it. We want to know fi-
nally that it will be paid off. We don't want it. That is the 
onlY,piece of property we have in that country. It is no good 
to us there. We have just had a lot of trouble with it.' That 
was the gist of the conversation, was the difficulty that had 
been had with the property in regard to financing. 
"Q. Have you given us the substance of the conversation 
that took place that day 1 
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"A. After the last end of the convers4tiOlii( why~'. ~ ;,""~""'" 
'Well, now, how will we handle these' papers'tog'etthis;.donef 
And Mr. Kennedy said, 'I can 't draw them uphe:hHn: 
minutes .. It takes time. We are busy. ~ilf.· Ydu:.Will,lb:tLUI5 
us in the list of the chattels on the property up there,'per-~, 
sonal property, so that we can make out this chattel mortga-ge; 
I will draw the papers or have them drawn and ,send; them., 
up to you.' We both agreed then. I asked them .ithat.: they;:;, 
were and it was to be a deed and a bill of sale, or;Q,. chattel~ 
mortgage rather, and the lease and the option.".'. . 
CROSS EXAMINATION .. ..... 
, ::'.~ .• ~ ': .' ~ .. !:l - ,i ~ 1,<J \. .' 'j 
'IMR. PLANT [d;fendant's attorneYJ~,.Q~ )~?lW:;,'jV{he~~ yo~, 
had that c~nversatlOn 'down there.att,h~?a~K;,p~'f<~~Pt~~per 
22, 1937, dIdn't you ask Mr. Kennedy If they'coWdn'~\ J:tt.st. 
let .the matter stay in abeyance and y()u:gi'\Te them 8;p.ew" 
mortgage? .' ', .. ,,"., ':"" 
"A. Yes.' I asked him if he could carry the 'property· Oii'~8:.· 
new mortgage and reduce the amount down to ::fifty-fivetho1i~ 
sand. . .' .. ,. . 
"Q. And didn't he say, 'We can't do that. We caii't,do 
that because we can't just write offfourteenthorisandand 
some odd hundred dollars, write off one mortgage and take 
a new one like that' 7 
" A. Yea. They couldn't do that on account of bank ex-
aminers or some ruling of the bank or some principle of the· 
bank that they didn't want to do it. 
"Q. He told you that they couldn't write off some fourteen 
thousand dollars and take a new mortgage f ' 
"A. No, couldn't take a new mortgage for 55,000. 
"Q. I didn't ask you that. Didn't Mr .. Kennedysay Jhat 
they couldn't write off fourteen thousand and s,ot:rie' odd hw:i-
dred dollars, write off one mortgage andtheit;,tll.'k:e another '. 
mortgage Y . if" {i. , 
" A. Well, those may have been the words,' yes, 'as I remem-
ber. That was the substance of the conversation. 
"Q. Yes. '. 
"A. One portion of it, but that isn't all o'::£t, 01 course. 
"Q. Didn't Mr. Kennedy at that time advise you they had . 
had too much trouble with that ranch already with fore-
closures and so forth r 
"A. Yes. 
\ 
·p-I.····· , 
" , \·\t ' i\.' , 
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I I Q. And what h<l would have to do is take a deed and 
clear the whole thing up Y 
I I A. Well, he told me, after the course of a lot of conver-
sation, he said that was the only way he would refinance it 
lor me, was to take a deed. 
"Q. That is the only thing he would do, was to take a deed 
. the property and clear the whole thing up' 
"c A. Well, I see you are reading from my deposition, yes. 
'probably said those words and that was probably the intent 
df. the conversation, was to clear the thing up and give it 
• new lien on life. 
"Q. And they would give you back a lease and an option' 
"A. Yes, that was the final conversation. 
• I Q. That is what he said, was it not Y 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Now at that time was there any discussion as to 
whether or not the Weiss indebtedness, that is the 74,000 
dollar indebtedness, would be satisfied or cancelled 1 
"A. Well, there might have been some little discussion but 
it didn't impress me very much at all as I can remember. 
There might have been some. 
"' Q. Wasn't the substance of that discussion this, that 
when you gave them the deed to the property they would 
cancel, that is, wipe out, the indebtedness that Mr. Weiss 
owed them! 
"A. That was my impression. It would be, naturally. 
When they took it, they would have to wipe that out in order 
to give me a new mortgage. That probably was said, yes. 
"Q. SO that you understood that that indebtedness was to 
be cancelled'! ' 
"A. Oh, I didn't-- nothing was promised me to that 
effect at all that I can recall. 
"' Q. But that was the substance of the discussion' 
"A. I suppose that was some of the substance of the dis-
cussion. 
"MR. PLANT [Reading from plaintiff's deposition portions 
of testimony relative to the disposition of the Weiss indebted-
ness] : 
" I A. [by Mr. Beeler) Well, before that I was in the bank 
there at one time, I don't recall what time it was. We were 
discussing about that fifty-three acres in the bottom land 
which was clear and they pulled out their folder there. I saw 
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them. It was either Jerry Kennedy or it was right there{ .'. 
by him and they showed me where they had a deed all ready 
for Mr. Weiss to sign to the ranch and to the fifty-three acres' 
besides, which was supposed to be free and clear or was free' .. 
and clear, so far as I was concerned. ' . 
" 'Q. [by Mr. Plant] Did he tell you what that deed was 
going to be for? . , . , 
I I I A. They were going to take it from Henry . Weiss ill 
lieu of his indebtedness. That was before I made a deal with 
Henry Weiss. . . 
" 'Q. That was in satisfaction of his indebtedness' . !' 
" 'A. That's what Henry Weiss was going to do.' 
"Now is that statement correct T 
"' A. That was my understanding, Mr. Plant; for them tak-
ing the deed. There wasn't anything said that they were to'. . 
cancel the indebtedness and they didn't go into that at .all 
but they just said, 'We have the deeds prepared for Henry 
Weiss to sign here,' and they did show me the deeds. . 
"Q. Was the statement I have just read you correct! 
"A. Yes, that I saw the deeds in there and that they would 
take the deeds for the property from Henry Weiss. . 
"Q. They were going to take that. deed in lieu of the in-
debtedness. 
"A. I said that voluntarily, Mr. Plant, that I assumed that 
is what they were doing it for and I still assume that is why 
they would take the deed. They didn't tell me that is what 
they would do it for. 
"Q. You knew that their taking a deed from you would 
have the same effect, is that correct Y 
"A. No. Why should I pay five thousand dollars for & 
deed a couple of months before and then just give it. away 
for nothing Y [Beeler had given Weiss a $5,000 promiss9Ty 
note and assumed Weiss' obligation in return for the deed 
from Weiss.] . , 
"Q. Isn't it a fact that you knew when' they took the deed" 
from you they were going to cancel your indebtedness f' ':: ... 
"A. No. I didn't know that. . ........ .·~!!./':l)};,;.! •. '''.' 
" Q. Well, I will call your attention ~agabito your'd~~osl'" 
tion: ... I will ask you if these questions were' asked yon driil,. 
'. . . . '. ! ~ > " ,,, •• ~<.';'~ ."' -;-./: these answers given Y . . . '. ::;. ' .. !. .', "'!.,: :.'~ 
'.' . ".", '" .' ...... :; , .. : , ,~' .. " {,\ ... ,',," , 
" 'Q. Now, was anything said about the'dispositioii'to p~~:' 
made of Mr. Weiss' notes during that conversation' ' ,,,I 
:'.~ 
Fn~'J \, :', 
:,~ ~ 
" 
BEELER v. AMERICAN TRUST CO. (24 C.2d 
14 
" 'A. Well, it was to be that when I gave them the deed to 
the property, why, then they would cancel~ well, that was 
automatically wiped out, the indebtedness that Mr. Weiss 
owed them. That' was about all the discussion there was 
"Was that your testimony at the taking of your deposition' about that.' 
"A. Yes, that was my testimony, because I was assuming 
the indebtedness." In summarization of the foregoing testimony, it may 
fairly be said that it ,shows that incident to the plaintiff's 
purchase 'of the ranch on July 28, 1937, and his assumption 
of his grantor's obligation to discharge the existing debt 
thereon, he had been attempting for some months to work 
out some feasible plan with the bank for a reduction of the 
loan; that the finitncial backing on which he relied to. meet 
the terms of the bank's $55,000 cash discount proposition of 
June, 1937', did' not materialize within the time scheduled; 
that in response to the bank's notice of default and election 
to sell under its deed of trust, served upon him on Septem-
ber 1; 1937, he visited the bank on September 22, 1937, to 
"make some other arrangement than the present arrange-
ment of paying the indebtedness off in 55,000 dollars cash"; 
that he discussed his problem of carrying the loan and con-
tinuing with the ranch, with several officers of the bank, but 
principally with Mr. Kennedy, the vice-pre!'i.ient in the real 
estate loan department, who offered as the only alternative 
to immediate foreclosure a refinancing scheme whereby the 
bank I' could write off the loan on the books" by taking a deed 
of the property and giving plaintiff a one-year lease with 
the option to purchase the ranch at any time during that 
period; that plaintiff did not want the transaction handled 
that way, but the bank's officers insisted on this form of pro-
cedure as plaintiff's only recourse; that the indebtedness was 
thereupon fixed at $60,000 instead of the previous discount 
figure of $55,000 because of the time extension commensurate 
with the option provision, and the rental was set at an amount 
equivalent to 5 per cent interest per annum on the aforesaid 
$60,000, or $3,000, payable semi-annually; that as security 
for his payment of said interest and the taxes on the prop-
erty for the ensuing year, plaintiff agreed to give the bank 
a chattel mortgage on certain equipment on the ranch. with 
the understanding that such mortgage would be returned 
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. to him upon his assigning to the bank a leMe which he was 
then .negotiating with respect to a portion of the ranch prop-
erty; that 'plaintiff had a tract of land in Paradise, Califor-
nia, which he wanted the bank to consider aBa"basis~or',)a 
reduction of the indebtedness in question; that m:Kenn.'edy. 
agreed to have an appraisal' of the Paradise property made 
some time during the course of the year and aCCOrding to 'the. 
valuation so established, the bank would "take ·it;iri" either, 
"to reduce the debt" or "asadditionaZ security;";: ", "'<';f 
Corroborative of the plaintiff's recital'of the' p'arties'nego •. ' 
tiations as c6ncerned only with the effectuation Of. '$lome :new, 
security arrangement which the plaintiff could !4a:ndIe; Su~ •.. 
cessfully is the testimony of a Mr. Browri, 'plaintiff's:banker;,r 
who was present during most of the conferenc~ orl)Septe'rriber;;:. 
22, 1937. This witness, when asked to givehfs'recollectioh 
of what occurred at the meeting, testified.'as fc:>ilows·~.;!~'Wel)~: 
it appeared that Mr. Beeler had acquired a::piEic~f;bf·property:., 
on which the American Trust Company held if,cfee'd'·o:hr1i~t.,: 
The American Trust Company had filed· noti6e ofbre~cli' ana> ': 
Mr. Beeler was there for tl1e purpose o:fiendeavO'ririgJi~.r;tti;? 
finance' it, get an extension or something: of that :sort,- arldi.li.ll, .•••... 
the time I was there it centered aroundthis\deedof;trUst)~i'.' 
A few days following this meeting between the 'parties,' the: 
bank forwarded to plaintiff for his' execution~ a deed' of 'con~'. 
veyance, a bill of sale of certain personal property (in the 
ranch in lieu of the chattel mortgage' theretofore specified, 
and a lease and option agreement-all documentswhfch the 
parties had discussed in their previous negotiationS, and which 
the plaintiff admittedly signed without questi'oD.;' -'However, 
with these papers the bank also sent.tothe' plahitiff[for sig{ 
nature an affidavit certifying, according to the pettineittfpr():, 
visions thereof above quoted,' the' na'tureof . th~' tran'Satltion 
as an absolute conveyance of title to property iD. compi~te' 
satisfaction and cancellation of an' exiSting indebtt~dness 
the'reon. Nothing had previously been said by any of the 
bank officials indicating that the bank wouid ask for, or 
would require any such affidavit. The plaintiff testified that 
before signing this affidavit he telephoned to the bank alid 
discussed the document with Mr. McIntyre, an assistant Vice~ 
president, who had prepared the necessary papers for the 
closing of the transaction, as follows: "I asked him what the. 
meanIng of the aftidavitwas, that there was' nothing sldd 
I~.\,.I:.:. 
. ii, :. 
I :,;i . 
ir' 
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about it before. He said, 'We have to have that ,to clear up 
the title, so it is all right and we can put it in the real estate 
department. The bank always takes those.' I didn't think 
anything about it. I said, 'If you have to have it, that is 
O.K. I will sign it.' So I did." At the trial upon' both 
direct and cross-examination with respect to this matter, Mr. 
McIntyre admitted that he told the plaintiff at the time in 
question that the affidavit was needed to satisfy a require-
ment of the title company before it would issue a title policy 
upon the property free of exceptions and that the bank was 
acting only as "an intermediary in the matter." On its face 
the affidavit in part sustains this statement as to its purpose, 
for it expressly provides: "This affidavit is made ... particu-
larly for the benefit of the TITLE INSURANCE AND GUARANTY 
COMPANY, which is about to insure the title to said property 
in reliance thereon." 
Also bearing on this matter is the following testimony of 
the plaintiff as to a conversation he had with Mr. McGlynn, 
an officer of the title company, before the transaction was 
finally closed: "We discussed, I told him rather , that this 
land was clear and so on, that I was deeding it all to the 
bank to refinance the loan, the way they wanted to do it. 
He said, 'You have given this affidavit. That takes you out, 
doesn't it?' I said, 'Why, no, I have a lease and an option 
and it is a form of refinancing.' He asked, 'What about this 
revenue stamp on the deed, where you are giving them the 
deed to the property l' I said, 'There is no need of any reve-
nue stamp on it at all, because it is just given to refinance 
the thing.' He said, 'You refuse to put the revenue stamp 
on ¥' I said, 'Certainly I do.' He said, 'I will have to take 
that up with the bank.' He said, 'You have your lease and 
option. I don't want to see them.' I said, 'Why7' He said, 
'We can't write a policy of title insurance if you aren't 
moving off the place and giving possession and turning that 
place over to them, if you aren't selling it to them.' I flaid, 
'I am not selling it to them.' He said, 'Then I will have to 
write to our attorneys in San .Francisco and advise them to 
make an exception to the property.' I said, 'Well, that is 
the story. I am not moving off the property.' He said, 'Are 
they paying you any money for it Y' I said, 'Absolutely not 
a cent. They don't have to becaUse I am just doing it to 
refinance.' " Consistent with the tenor of this conversation 
Apr. 1944] BEELER v. AMERICAN TRUST Co: 
[24 0.2d 11 
the title company thereafter issued its policye~re~sl~~:~;>: 
cepting ,jany rights of C. W. Beeler, whois iripossessiori~,'.:7,:" 
significantly without reference to his occupancy of the pr6:p~: 
erty as a lessee-and the bank accepted the policy' in thi8 " 
form, although it had previously indicated it wanted the title ' 
certificate free of such exception. 
Other matters of some relevancy in considering thestat~ 
of the parties as the result of their consummation of the 
presently disputed transaction appear from the record:: 
While the testimony relative to the value of the property 
is in direct conflict, the estimate of the plaintiff and his wit-
nesses supports the trial court's finding that the ranch was 
worth "in excess of $135,000." [3] This accredited evi~ 
dence indicating the extent of the inequality between the 
worth of the property and the consideration stated in the 
conveyance, to wit, $60,000, the amount claimed by the b8.nk . 
to accord with its appraisal figure, is a "strong circumstance" 
tending to show that the deed was intended to operate as a. 
mortgage. (Husheon v. Husheon, 71 Cal. 407 [12 P. 410] ; 
Emery v. Lowe, 140 Cal. 379 [73 P. 981] ; Lockhart v. J.I1. 
McD01tgall 00., 190 Cal. 308 [212 P. 1] ; Reynolds v. Hook, 
109 Cal.App. 226 [292 P. 1000] ; see, aIso, annotation i:ri. .9~ 
A.L.R. 953-963; 17 Cal.Jur. 788, § 88.) [4] Moreover,the 
yearly rental value of the property stands uncontroverted in, 
the record as "in excess of $7,500" and the trial court.so 
found, yet under the terms of the plaintiff's' lease with the 
bank the sum denominated rental for the premises was but 
$3,000 per year-a disparity of some significance, particu-
Jarly in view of the further evidence that such sum was 
fixed by the bank at an amount equivalent to the interest 
rate of 5 per cent per annum on the indebtedness at the, re-
duced figure of $60,000 and payable semi-annually. This, 
too, eonstitutes a "strong circumstance" tending to show that 
the "rent" under the lease agreement was in reality an in-
terest payment consistent with the character of· the transac-
tion as a loan. (Oouts v. Winston, 153 Cal. 686 [96 P. 357]; 
17 Oal.Jur. 786, § 86.) [5] Still another matter to be ,here 
noted is the fact that after the recordation of the deed from . 
the plaintiff, the instrument purportedly given in extinguish-
ment of the existing i'ndebtedneFl.'!, the bank continu.ed· to re-
tain in its possession the two promiRsorynotes-one .. for 
$60,000 and the other for $14,40O-evidencing the debt,;86!-
:, 
:G 
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cured by the aforementioned trust deed made by 'the plain-
tiff's grantor and expressly assumed by the plaintiff in the 
terms of his purchase of the property. While it appears that 
following said recordation the bank made certain entries and 
transfers on its records designed to indicate full payment of 
the debt, endorsed on the back of the $60,000 note "We have 
acquired title by deed. Note cancelled" and "wrote off" the 
$14,400 note as a loss, such bookkeeping procedure of itself 
is no more effectual to establish the discharge of the debt than 
would be the act of the payee in writing the word "Paid" 
across the face of the note, without relinquishment thereof 
to the maker. There being no delivery of the notes either 
to Mr. Weiss, the plaintiff's grantor, or to the plaintiff him-
self, the mentioned notations of the bank in this regard have 
no force or effect here. (Wittman v. Pickens, 33 Colo. 484 
[81 P. 299] ; Hanna v.McCrory, 19 N.M. 183 [141 P. 996] ; 
First State Bank of Hilger v. Lang, 55 Mont. 146 [174 P. 
597, 9 A.L.R. 1139].) [2b] As to the parties' conduct subsequent to the finan-
cial arrangement in question, the following evidence is pel,'-
tinent: In December, 1937, a great flood occurred in the 
Sacramento River, as the result of which many permanent 
improvements on the property here involved were damaged 
or destroyed. The plaintiff testified that he communicated the 
magnitude' of his loss to certain officers of the bank, that he 
asked them for a loan-not a contribution-;-of money to de· 
fray the expense of repair 8,nd reconstruction, that they de-
clined to give him the financial assistance he requested, and 
that he expended approximately the sum of $3,000 in making 
the necessary structural replacements on the ranch. While 
the terms of the lease required the plaintiff during the term 
thereof to make ordinary repairs on the property I his under-
taking a program of improvements on the scale intimated by 
the mentioned outlay of expense is a factor substantiating 
his claim of continued occupancy of the property as owner. 
The plaintiff further testified that in the course of one of his 
conversations with the officers of the bank relative to the 
:flood damage, he mentioned that he cont~mplated selling some 
276 walnut trees growing on the ranch; that they agreed with 
him that the removal of such trees would improve the prop-
erty and that he should keep the proceeds from such sale; 
that he consummated the sale for the sum of $1,800, which 
amount he retained without objection from the bank. This 
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arrangement as detailed by the plaintiff was not contradicted 
by the bank, and it, too, reflects the plaintiff's exercise of the 
rights of ail owner in relation to the ranch property. Also', 
to be n{)ted here is the fact that some few months after the 
negotiations of the parties on September 22, 1937, resulting 
in the financial· plan now in controversy, the. plaintiff made 
two leases of different portions of the propertY.7 one for· 
$2,750 .and the other for $4,500-the latter,inaccordance 
with the parties' understanding on the date mentioned,. being 
assigned by the pfaintiff to the bank in payment ofliiS,afore-: 
said yearly rental charge of $3,000, and the second i~stall-. 
ment of the 1937-1938 taxes on the ranch. The plaintiff. di~ 
cussed both of these lease propositions with the officers of the, . 
bank at the meeting of September 22, 1937
" 
alid,as ultimately: 
concluded, they both were executed as leases,nofaa sub-IeaS'es,: 
of a tenant in possession of property. . , .. , .. , ':" .. " ',,:. 
Also to be noted at this point is the plaintiff's 'testimony 
relative to a conversation had with a rep~esentative{)f,:the, 
bank in January, 1938, regarding the,appraisa(ofhisPara~, 
dise property." " ... "." "<,:';; 
II . , . " J .' , '.l·.l '.J ~ 1." 
DIRECT EXAMINATION; h,iil\]:,;ni" VSi/l hQ.lj 
, • " .'. .' • , 'T :- '. ~.-". :; .' •• 
. "MR. CARTE:a: Q. State what the'conversationi ,w8.s"[witH;) . 
Mr. Kennedy]. . 'i r< ,\JJ11 ~ihY/IV(~~] 
"A. I asked him, 'What did Mr. , Ell)erg';[th)ibanlf'i1: 
appraiser] report on the valuation' of'the'p'i'dperffjfilna1w6~ir 
they still take it in to reduce the amount;ofJh:~n~l l"in\'ed!: 
them. ' He said, 'The only way we can take it 'in is 'as additional' 
security.' I said, 'I don't want togiveyo{f any', additional' 
security. I want to get rid of the place' and pay iOn onthiit 
property, .theZoan that lowe you.' He sa1d;'Wii 'cari't'%>' '. 
.that but we will take it in as additiondt '$ecurity;'~ \thicl('/F 
refused to do." I \C, ,,'H'. i!JI/! ~,JJ) 
"Q. As additional security for th~' I, ;'I';;,)i!T, 
"A. Sixty thousand dollars.' , ". ",., "" \('; iii 
"Q. Was that subsequent to the 27tli day of Septembe~;" 
19377 ' .. 
. )' .. : ~, ' , .. 11 
"A. Yes, it was in January of 1938." ·:t 
CRoss-ExAMINATION" ,; "",".; " 
"MR. PLANT: Q. Now when you werit':do-wn)~iJ'd\iklk~~{' 
to Mr. Kennedy, as you say, about this Paradise pr()perty'you:' 
. ,'" . 'j';,', 
, , 
(;r.~ 
1> 
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referred to 'the loan which lowe you and to my indebted-
ness to you,' did you Y 
"A. Again, Mr. Plant, I won't say those were the exact 
words but in substance that is about it. 
'''Q. As a matter of fact, neither the word 'loan' or the 
word 'indebtedness' were ever used, were they' 
: "A. Yes, Mr. Plant, they were used and have been from 
the beginning, until they decided they wanted to get it away 
from me." 
While much of the foregoing recital is based upon evidence 
introduced on behalf of the plaintiff and in some important 
respects is flatly contradicted by witnesses for the defendant 
bank-particularly in regard to the purpose of the financial 
arrangement made by the parties at the conference of Sep-
tember 22, 1937, as a cancellation of the existing indebted-
nesS on the ranch rather than another loan transaction-it 
must be remembered that all questions of preponderance and 
conflict of evidence are for the trial court. That court had 
the right to accept the plaintiff's version of this controversial 
Ihatter aB true, and apparently did so. Thus accepted, it was 
plainly sufficient to justify the finding that the deed in ques-
tion WaB intended as a mortgage to secure the antecedent 
debt as discounted by the bank in formulating the refinancing 
plan with the plaintiff. In view of this accredited evidence 
relative to a continuing, subsisting loan, the following lan-
guage from the case of Ohapman v. Hicks, 41 Cal.App. 158, 
162-163 [182 P. 336] is pertinent: "The test of a mortgage 
is whether the relation of debtor and creditor continues so 
that there is a subsisting debt after the conveyance [citing 
cases]; and where a deed, absolute on its face, is given to 
secure a debt, it will be held to be a mortgage even though 
the parties stipulate it shall be an absolute conveyance. 
([Citing] Hodgkins v. Wright, 127 Cal. 688 [60 P. 431] .... ) . 
The intention of the parties must govern, and it matters not 
what particular form the transaction may take. If the deed 
is made for the purpose of securing the payment of a debt, 
it is a mortgage, 'no matter how strong the language of the 
deed, or any instrument accompanying it, may be.' ([Citing] 
Woods "V. Jensen, 130 Cal. 200 [62 P. 473].)" 
[6] Nor is a different principle applicable here because 
the plaintiff executed contemporaneously with his deed an 
affidavit declaring the transaction to be an absolute convey-
ance and not intended as a mortgage. While the authorities 
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in this country are divided with' reference .. ' 
whether a deed and an accompanying memorandumio:t!agree'~i: 
ment, or option of resale to the grantor, may'be'; 
parol evidence to be'a mortgage where the termS 'of 
orandum unambiguously negative the existence,·.of 'an'ind~ __ , 
edness '(see elaborate annotation of cases on the subJect in" 
111 A.L.R. 448), it is the settled law of this state not to,hold 
such writing a conclusive criterion of the chl1racter~ of ,the 
transaction. In Vance v. Anderson, 113 Cal. 532, 538 [45P. 
816] this court set forth the basic doctrine asfollow$:' in ,A: 
deed absolute on its face may bc shown, byparol;;~obe ,in-" 
tended as a mortgage. It may be stated, as a generalpropo~ 
sition, that in this state, at least, every conveyanceof:reaI 
property made as security for the performan~e of ,.an obli~ , " .' 
gation is,in equity, a mortgage, irrespective o'fthe form in ' 
which. it is made. Equity looks beyond the'mere form in 
which th,e transaction is clothed, and shapes, its relief in such 
way as to carry out the true intent of the parties to the agree~ 
ment, and to this end all the facts and circumstances of the 
transaetion, the conduct of the parties thereto, and their dec-
larations against their own interests, their relations to one 
another, and to ,the subject matter, are subjects for consider~ 
ation. [Citing cases.]" In thus regarding "all the facts 
and circumstances of the transaction" so as to execute the 
real intention of the parties, the rule prevents either of the 
parties to the disputed instrument committing a fraud on 
the other by claiming it as an absolute conveyance, notwith-
standing it WaB given and accepted as security .. "To inSist 
on what was really a mortgage, as a sale, is in equity' a fraud' 
which cannot be successfully practiced under the shelter. of 
any written papers, however precise and complete they may" ' ' 
appear to be." (Italics added.) Peninsular Trading & .FiSh-' 
ing Oompany v. Pacific Steam Whaling Oompany, 123· Cal.· 
689, 694 [56 P. 604].) . . 
The defendant bank's citation of the early case of People 
ex rel. Ford v. Irwin (1861), 18 Cal. 117, in support of its 
argument that in this jurisdiction parol evidence may not be 
received to vary or dispute the terms of a written instru-
ment concerning the purpose of executing a deed, is of no 
avail here. That case involved a deed absolute and a cori-
tract to reconvey. One Arnold owed the plaintiff,' Ford, the 
sum of $8,600. Arnold conveyed the real property in ques-
tion by grant, bargain and sale deed to Ford, who, at the 
,. , 
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same time delivered to Arnold a written agreement to recon-
vey the property, in which it was stipulated: "This shall only 
be treated as a contract to convcy, and not as an acknowl-
edgment that said conveyance from Arnold and wife to my-
self was intended as a mortgage. " The opinion does not refer 
to any ruling upon the admission or exclusion of parol evi-
dence, but discusses the problem as one of the proper con-
struction of the instruments in the light of the evidence 
which had been received. Thus, it was held that evidence that 
the actual consideration for the deed was a pre-existing in-
debtedness equal in amount to the sum required to be paid 
upon a reconveyance of the property was sufficient to impress 
upon the deed the character of a mortgage "unless controlled 
by the clause referred to in the contract" (that is, the stipu-
lation above quoted) j that the object of the clause was to 
"repel" any and all presumptions which the law would oth-
erwise have indulged in relation to the deed, and that there 
was "no doubt that the parties could, by a provision for that 
purpose, exclude all extraneous circumstances" affecting the 
character of the transaction j that such clause in the contract 
did not take away or interfere in any respect with the effi-
cacy of the contract, but simply repelled "any presumption 
from outside facts, giving· to it an operation different from 
that intended by the parties." 
To the extent that the discussion in the Ford case would 
limit the court to the consideration of only the deed and the 
accompanying written instrument, without regard for other 
evidence in the case, in determining the. real nature of the 
disputed transaction, it is inconsif;ltent with the import of 
the ,subsequently adopted code provision on the subject and 
cannot be approved. Section 2924 of the Civil Code from 
the date of its original enactment in 1872 has provided that 
every transfer of an interest in property, other than in trust, 
made only as a security for the performance of another act, 
is to be deemed a mortgage. In' accord with the implication 
of this statutory pronouncement, it was properly recognized, 
in Vance v. Anderson (1896), supra, that a collateral written 
agreement declaring that a contemporaneously executed deed 
should be treated as an absolute conveyance, and not as a 
mortgage, was not conclusive but only one of the facts and 
cir<lumstances of the transaction worthy of consideration in 
determining the real intention of the parties. If by' a sep-
arate writing the parties expressly agree, at the same time 
~ 
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an absolute deed is executed, t4at it Is what' it 'purportS c.&,~, 
be, that is, an absolute sale, tha~ would' benoinore .~~n; 
what the deed itself says. Therefore, if they eQuld thnsavoid 
its real effect as a mortgage, the true natureo! such ,8 tran~ 
saction could never be shown, and the policy of the law n'ever; 
to permit a security to be converted by any contemporaneou$ 
agreement into a sale could be constantly evaded. (Civ~ 
Code, § § 2924, 2925 j Pierce v. Robinson, 13 Cal. 116; Wehle 
v. Price, 202 Cal. 394 [260 P. 878J; Oarlson v. RobinsOn,,7 
Cal.2d 235 [60 P .2d 426 J .) The right of a mortgagee to be-
come the purchaser of the equity is unquestioned, but the 
relations of the parties are such' that the transaction will be 
carefully scrutinized to prevent the effectuation of some de~ 
vice whereby the debtor under . the force of neceSsitoUs cir. 
cumstances is deprived of his, right of redemption. (Oiv. 
Code, § 2889 j Russell v. Southard, 12 lIow. (U.S.), i39 " [13 
L.Ed. 927] j Peugh v.' Davis, 96 U.S. 332 [24' t.Eid.775]i 
Bradbury v. Davenport, 114 Cal. 593 [46 P. 1062, 55 Am.St. 
Rep. 92J j Jones on Mortgages, §§ 251, 1045.) The rule in 
such a case is said to be substantially. the same as that pre~ , 
vaiIing when the deed of a beneficiary to his trustee is, ques~ 
tioned. (Villa v. Rodriguez, 12 Wall. (U.S.) 323 [20, L.Ed. 
406J j Bradbury v. Davenport, supra.) , , ' " 
A situation presenting considerations strikingly" akin. to 
those here involved was recently before the appellate ,court, 
in the second decision in Davis v. Stewart, 53,Cal.App.2d439 
[127 P.2d 1014] and adjudicated, in accordance ~th,~the 
views hereinabove expressed. There, as here,::ii,deed ,absolute 
on its· face was claimed to be only amortmi(;As,'a'il~i:t,p,~ 
the transaction in which the deed was given; the'gi~~rttOi'a'ri(i 
grantee entered into an elaborate,. Written" aIP-eei;n,en,t, 
among other things provided: Ott)s'understo4iI 
that :£irst party shall become, ,'upon'executioh'ana: 
of said deed the absolute owner ,of :sald ,f • ,-, 
with all improvements thereon and' that', 
not constitute a mortgage, subject oiiIyho'Wl 
option for said :£ive-year period." . ,(See ,rediial 
Stewart, 81 Cal.App.2d 574, 576[88P:2d7841.( 
tion, the trial court admitted oral itestiniony'ft'o'th~ 
notwithstanding the declarations, of "thti.'cohtempC:i.raneoffi. 
writing, the' deed was in fact'intendeaas' 'se:cuHiYtJ ' 
payment of a debt, 'l"hereafterfiridings were:i:tJ.ade''b:t'accbrd~' 
I,~.\ ! 
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ance with the oral evidence, and the judgment establishing 
the deed as a mortgage was affirmed. The defendant bank 
argues that the situation in the Davis case is distinguishable 
because the written agreement there did not expressly pro-
vide, as does the affidavit here, that the deed "was not and 
is not now intended ., . as security of any kind ... " and 
hence evidence extrinsic to the writing was properly received 
to remove the uncertainty as to whether or not the disputed 
instrument was given in satisfaction of the antecedent indebt-
edness. That is but a tenuous distinction and will not bear 
close scrutiny. In both cases the import of the contempora-
neous writing is the same-the negation of a security arrange-
ment incident to the subsistence of the debt-and whether 
one writing amplifies by detailed recitals the purported pur-
pose of the parties to execute an absolute transfer of title 
to the property involved is an immaterial consideration. Cer-
tllinly, in neither instance is the language of the accompany-
ing instrument so obscure as to require extrinsic evidence for 
its explanation or understanding. And, in one case as in the 
other, the declaration of the writing would not be held con-
trolling unless it should appear upon complete evidence that 
it was in harmony with t t aU the facts and circumstances of 
the transaction." (Vance v. Anderson, supra.) 
In concluding the discussion of this phase of the present 
appeal, it is sufficient to state that the circumstances of the 
whole case, as reflected by the evidence accredited in the 
trial court, are entirely consistent with the view that the 
defendant bank, while in fact agreeing on a loan to be se-
cured by mortgage, was desirous, for reasons of certain.inter-
departmental requirements connected with its routine book-
keeping procedure, of giving the transaction a different ap-
pearance by recording it as an absolute transfer of title. Such 
cases cited by the defendant bank as Henley v. Hotaling, 41 
Cal. 22; Farmer v. Grose, 42 Cal. 169; Woods v. Jensen, 130 
Cal. 200 [62 P. 473] ; Wehle v. Price, 202 Cal. 394 [260 P. 
878] ; and Goodfellow v. Goodfellow, 219 Cal. 548 [27 P.2d 
898], wherein an absolute deed was sustained as such in the 
face of the claim that it was intended by the parties as a 
mortgage, merely rest upon an affirmance of the trial court's 
judgment as based upon substantial evidence and thus do 
not conflict with the fundamental premise of this opinion as to 
an appellate court's function in reviewing the record to de-
termine whether challenged findings lack evidentiary support. 
, 
I 
i 
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[7] There is no force here to the contention of the defen- , 
dant bank that there was no consideration for the agreement 
for the reduction of the indebtedness as claimed by the plain-
tiff to have been made between the parties at the basic con~ 
ference of September 22, 1937, as aforesaid. In theflrst 
place, the record discloses that the trial court found. on sub-
stantial evidence that at said meeting the parties concluded 
with respect to various phases of the contemplated financial 
arrangement a number of reciprocal" agreements, of which 
one concerned the understanding as to the discount of the 
existing debt; that as the result of theSe integrated negotia-
tions the deed jn question was executed and the parties have 
acted thereunder, though in dispute as to the real purpose 
of the conveyance. [8] But regardless of this observation, 
the record further shows that this matter of lack of considera-
tion was not pleaded in the trial court, that the ca~ waS 
tried on other issues entirely and as if such point did not 
enter into the case; consequently, such objection may not 
properly be raised for the first time on appeal. (2 Cal.Jur. 
234-235, § 67; Los Angeles Inv. 00. v. Home Soo. Bank, 180 
Cal. 601 [182 P. 293, 5 A.L.R. 1193].) 
[9] Two additional questions presented by the record re-
quire some discussion. The first of these relates to the pay-
ment" of taxes on the property involved. As above stated, 
the lease agreement expressly placed this obligation upon the 
plaintiff during the one-year period therein specified-Octo-
ber 1, 1937, to September 30, 1938. With regard to the first 
installment of the 1937-1938 taxes, the record discloses that 
the plaintiff on November 30, 1937, received from the bank 
a letter enclosing the bill for the taxes covering the real prop-
erty and stating that the bill covering a separate assessment 
with respect to certain personal property on th"e ranch had 
been forwarded to the plaintiff's grantor, Mr. Weiss, who was 
responsible therefor; that on December 3, 1937, the plaintiff 
gave the tax collector his check for the amount of the real 
property taxes; that subsequently the tax collector notified 
the bank as to the receipt of the plaintiff's check, but stated 
that such segregable amount of the entire tax bill could not 
be accepted until payment of the personal property assess-
ment was made; that the bank suggested to the plaintiff by 
letter that he pay the balance of the tax bill and deduct that 
amount from Ii. certain sum he then owed to Mr. Weiss in 
: ~~ 
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connection with the purchase of the ranch; that the plaintiff 
did nothing further in the matter and on April 25, 1938, his 
check for the real property taxes was returned to him by the 
tax collector; that the bank on May 16, 1938, served on the 
plaintiff a notice to quit the premises for breach of his lease, 
and subsequently commenced unlawful detainer proceedings. 
The plaintiff testified that in June, 1938, he called at the 
defendant bank and offered to pay the delinquent taxes, in-
cluding those on the personal property in question, if the 
bank would not prosecute the eviction proceedings; that he 
then had sufficient money in his bank account to substantiate 
his offer of payment; and that the officers of the defendant 
bank refused to accept his proposition. As previously noted, 
the unlawful detainer action resulted in a judgment in favor 
of the plaintiff herein because of the defect in the notice of 
breach with respect to the amount of his tax liability. In 
view of this evidence the trial court properly concluded that 
the defendant bank should be reimbursed to the extent of its 
payment of the first installment of the real property taxes, 
$477.88, but that the running of interest on such sum was 
stopped by virtue of the plaintiff's offer of payment made in 
good faith and with ability to perform. (Civ. Code, § 1485.) 
[10] As to the second installment of the 1937-1938 taxes, 
there arises the question of the effect of the plaintiff's assign-
ment of a certain lease to the bank in discharge of this obli-
gation. The plaintiff testified that at the aforesaid confer-
ence of September 22, 1937, he agreed to assign to the bank 
"to pay the interest [rent] and the taxes" a lease he was 
then negotiating with respect to a portion of the ranch; that 
such assignment was accordingly made "to pay up all of the 
three thousand dollars and the second half of the taxes in 
full" ; that following the bank's acceptance of the assignment 
he was given it "receipt for all the payments, the interest 
payments" that he owed it. While certain witnesses for the 
defendant bank stated at the trial that the assignment was 
taken only as security for the amount of the rental charge 
and the specified tax installment, the instrument itself pur-
ports to be absolute on its face and apparently the court so 
construed it in accordance with the plaintiff's positive testi-
mony in the matter. Accordingly, the trial court's finding 
to the effect that the assignment was in full payment of the 
aforesaid second installment of taxes, as well as for the 
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rental charge of $3,000 under the terms of the lease agree-
ment, is binding on this appeal, and the defendant bank's 
claim that the plaintiff is indebted to it in the amount of 
said tax installment cannot be sustained. 
However, the record further establishes, and the plaintiff 
so concedes, that pending the trial of this action the defen-
dant bank paid the first installment of the 1938-1939 taxes 
amounting to $430 on the real property here involved. Appa-
rently the trial court inadvertently failed to make any find-
ing as to this matter. Since there is no question as to the 
validity of the bank's claim for reimbursement for this expen-
diture, we are authorized under section 956a of the Code of 
Civil Procedure to supply the missing finding. We, therefore, 
find" That the defendant, American Trust Company, paid the 
first installment of the 1938-1939 taxes on said real property, 
amounting to the sum of $430, and that pursuant to the 
agreement of the parties, it was the duty of the plaintiff to 
pay said first installment, and said defendant should be reim-
bursed ~or its payment thereof; that there is now due and 
owing from the plaintiff to the defendant, American Trust 
Company, the sum of $430, but without interest thereon be-
cause of said defendant's refusal of the offer of payment 
hereinafter in these findings referred to." (Finding to be 
numbered XXVIIIa.) 
The defendant, having paid the sum of $430 On a~count 
of the taxes due for the year 1938-1939, as well as the sum 
of $477.88 on account of the taxes for the previous year, is 
entitled to be reimbursed in the aggregate amount of $907.88. 
For the purpose of making the findings harmonize, it is 
further necessary to modify Finding XXXIV by strikmg 
out subdivision 2 thereof and inserting in its place the fol-
lowing: , 
"2. The sum of $907.88, being the amount of taxes on 
said real property for the years 1937-1938 and 1938-1939 
paid by the said defendant, American Trust Company, to-
gether with legal interest upon said amount from the date 
of entry of the decree in this action." . 
The conclusions of law are also modified so as to meet these 
changes in the findings of fact. . 
The second and final point presented for determinatio:q 
relates to the proper allowance of interest .to be made, to .the. 
defendant bank with reference to the adjudicatedlnort~~ge 
indebtedness of $60,000. It is claimed by the plainilif and 
{~--~- -' 
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found by the trial court that a tender of this amount was 
made to the defendant bank some few months before due 
under the parties' agreement and that because of such tender 
and refusal thereof, the bank is not entitled to interest from 
that date. (Civ. Code, § 1504.) The defendant bank con-
tends that the tender, if in fact made, was insufficient to stop 
the running of interest. [11] The finding of the trial court upon the matter of 
tender is substantially as follows: That on June 20, 1938, at 
the defendant bank the plaintiff offered to pay his indebted-
ness in good faith, and was ready, willing and able to do so; 
that prior to that date plaintiff had entered into an arrange-
ment with one MacArthur whereby the latter had agreed to 
advance to plaintiff the amount of money necessary to pay 
the indebtedness; that said MacArthur was financially able 
to make the requisite advancement, and was ready and will-
ing to do so; that this offer was made to Mr. Kennedy, vice-
president of the bank; that said Kennedy refused that offer 
without specifying any objection to its form, and refused to 
deal with the plaintiff in the matter in any way, 'but de-
manded that the plaintiff vacate the property within thirty 
days; that by virtue of its said officer's actions the defen-
dant bank waived objection to the mode of the offer and 
waived tender or other offer; that such offer of performance 
suspended the running of interest upon the indebtedness. 
This finding is in strict accord with the plaintiff's evi-
dence on the subject. In regard to his interview with Mr. 
Kennedy on the day mentioned, the plaintiff testified as fol-
lows: "Well, I went into the bank. He [Kennedy] was sit-
ting at his desk .... He apparently-well, he was sore because 
I came in. He told me before he didn't want to deal with 
me. I said, 'I will come in. I have a man by the name of 
Roderick MacArthur that will give me enough money that 
I can liquidate this indebtedness and I want to talk to you 
about it and see what we can do to get it closed up.' He 
said, 'I don't want to talk to you. You get out of this bank. 
We have had nothing but trouble with you and all these 
leases and everything and I don't want to talk to you at all. 
We want you to get off of that ranch and if you are not off 
in thirty days we will put you off.' I tried to talk further. 
I tried to say something, and he walked off and said, 'I don't 
want to talk to you. You get out of here.''' Mr. MacArthur 
corroborated the plaintiff's statement with respect to their 
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prior arrangement for the necessary advance of money, and 
added that he was financially able to discharge the indebted-
ness at the time he so agreed to assist the plaintiff. While 
Mr. Kennedy on behalf of the bank gave an entirely different 
account of the conversation had with the plaintiff on the day 
in question, the trial court in its findings expressly denied 
credence to the substance of his testimony. Since, as afore-
stated, the credibility of witnesses is a matter wholly within 
the province of the trial court, its discretion as here exer-
cised will not be di<:turbedon appeal. 
The evidence accredited by the trial court supports not 
only its finding as to the fact of the offer of payment, but 
also its sufficiency to prevent the running of interest on the 
plaintiff's obligation. Thus, it appears that Mr. Kennedy as 
representative of the defendant bank declined absolutely to 
negotiate with the plaintiff in the matter and, without mak-
ing any objection as to the form of the tender or questioning 
the plaintiff's ability to perform his offer, he simply refused 
to consider the proposition that the plaintiff had the right to 
protect his interest in the property involved. Upon this basis 
the trial court was warranted in concluding that any further 
action by the plaintiff in this respect would have met with 
like rebuff by the bank, and that a valid offer having once 
been made and refused, the indebtedness ceased to bear in-
terest as of that date. (Civ. Code, §§ 1496,1501, 1504; Lock-
hart v. J. H. McDougall Co., 190 Cal. 308 [212 P. 1].) 
In accordance with the views above expressed, the judg-
ment is modified by striking therefrom the figures $477.88, 
and inserting in their place the figures $907.88, and as so 
modified, the judgment is affirmed. Neither party to recover 
costs on appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J. pro 
tem., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-The evidence in this case is 
insufficient, in my opinion, to uphold the trial court's find-
ing that defendant, with a deed of trust on real property 
worth over $135,000 securing an indebtedness of $81,232.90, 
entered into an agreement to reduce the indebtedness to 
$60,000 and to accept an inarticulated mortgage in place of 
its deed of trust. 
r 
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Since a mortgage secures an obligation it cannot be proved 
that a conveyance is intended as a mortgage' if there is no 
liability "independent of the conveyance and contract of 
conveyance, which the grantee can enforce against the 
grantor." (4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, [Symons' 
fifth ed., 1941] § 1195, p. 579; Holmes v. Warren, 145 
Cal. 457 [78 P. 954]; Ohapman v. Hicks, 41 Cal.App. 158 
[182 P. 336]; see 17 Cal.Jur. 783.) The only debt in the 
present case was that represented by Weiss's promissory 
notes, and no relation was established between these notes 
and the deed,option, and lease. The amount payable by 
plaintiff to exercise the option was different from the amount 
~ due on the notes, and the rent payable until the exercise of 
the option was different from the interest prescribed by the 
notes. The only evidence regarding .the notes in the disput~d 
transaction shows that they were to be cancelled when plain-
tiff executed his deed to defendant. Both defendant's officers 
and plaintiff testified to that effect. When plaintiff's deposi-
tion was taken before the trial, plaintiff was asked, "Now, 
was anything said about the disposition to be made of Mr. 
Weiss's notes during that conversation 7 " and answered, 
"Well, it was to be that when I gave them the deed to the 
property, why, then they would cancel-well, that was auto-
matically wiped out, the indebtedness that Mr. Weiss owed 
them. " Plaintiff also testified, "As far as. the notes, I know 
when they took a deed to the property and reconveyed it that' 
these notes and the mortgage would be wiped' out, if the 
deed was standing in the bank's name." 
Plaintiff testified unequivocally on that occasion· that the 
notes were to .be cancelled. His later testimony was incon-
sistent. At timeS he did not recall clearly what, if anything, 
was said about the notes. When asked whether there was a 
discussion as to the satisfaction or cancellation of the notes, 
he replied, "Well, there might have been some little discus-
sion but it didn't impress me very much at all that I can 
remember. There might have been some." At times he ad-
hered to his earlier testimony that the notes were to. be can-
celled or satisfied. He was asked, "Wasn't the substance of 
that discussion this, that when you gave them the deed to the 
property they would cancel, that is, wipe out, the indebted-
ness that Mr. Weiss owed them Y" He replied, "That was 
my impression. It would be, naturally. When they took it, 
Apr. 1944] gEiELER V. AlItERiCAN TRUST Co: 
[24 O.2d 11 
a1 
they would have to wipe that out in order to give me a new 
mortgage. That was probably said, yes." He was also asked, 
"They were going to take that deed in lieu of the indebted. 
ness?" and answered, "I said that voluntarily, Mr. Plant, 
that I assumed that is what they were doing it for and I still· 
assume that is why they would take the deed." Yet, when 
asked, "Isn't it a fact that you knew when they took the 
deed from you they were going to cancel your indebtedness f" 
plaintiff replied, "No, I didn't know that." 
Plaintiff, in taking the position that the notes were to be 
cancelled but that somehow the debt was not, appears to have 
been influenced by the belief that some obligation against 
him existed apart from the notes. When confronted' with his 
earlier testimony, he did not repUdiate it but said, "Yes that 
was my testimony, because I was assuming the indebtedness." 
Plaintiff's brief suggests that the assumption agreement with 
Weiss created "an independent contract obligation that was 
to continue," and that "the Weiss indebtedness was to be 
satisfied and his own continued." . 
The only liability plaintiff agreed to assume, however, was 
the indebtedness represented by Weiss's promissory notes 
and secured by the deed of trust. There was but one indebt-
edness, and while plaintiff became primarily liable therefor 
and Weiss secondarily liable under the assumption agree-
ment, its satisfaction would necessarily end both liabilities. 
Plaintiff's testimony cannot be construed to suggest that this 
indebtedness was to be satisfied as to Weiss, but continued as 
to plaintiff, for in his answer to a suit brought by Weiss .he 
declared that "he did fulfil and carry out the terms of -his 
'. . 
. agreement regarding the payment of said obligation against 
said property and did procure the same to be released and 
satisfied in fulL" What the trial court. found, moreover,. was 
not that the deed was taken as security for some.independent 
obligation arising from the assumption. agreement but· that 
it was executed pursuant to an agreement that the "trust 
deed indebtedness and interest" I.e;, the Weiss indebtedness, 
should be reduced and the deed taken as security for' the re-: 
duced indebtedness. The contention that the Weiss indebted. 
ness was to be satisfied and the deed taken as security does 
not support the finding but impeaches it.' The finding can-
not be sustained unless it can be concluded that plaintiff 
" >' 
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and defendant's officers understood that the Weiss notes were 
to continue in effect. 
The evidence establishes without contradiction that it was 
intended that these notes be cancelled. Pursuant to that 
understanding plaintiff executed the deed to defendant. De-
fendant marked the large note cancelled and wrote off the 
smaller note at a loss, insi13ted upon receiving plaintiff's affi-
davit that the deed was executed in full satisfaction of the 
indebtedness, and recorded the reconveyance reciting full 
satisfaction of the indebtedness. Once these steps were taken 
the bank was powerless to enforce payment of the notes. The 
only reason in the majority opinion for holding that the debt 
survived this operation is that the notes could not be can-
celled without delivery to Weiss or to plaintiff. It is settled, 
however, that the parties to a note can extinguish the obliga-
tion thereof by accepting something other than the perform-
ance promised. (Civ. Code, §§ 1521, 1522; Silvers v. Gross-
man, 183 Cal. 696 [192 P. 534] ; B. &; W. Engineering Co. v. 
Beam, 23 Cal.App. 164 [137 P. 624] ; see Brannan's Negotiable 
Instrument's Law, [Beutel's sixth ed., 1938] §119 (4), pp. 
963, 964.) It has always been clear that the obligation of a 
note can thus be terminated without delivery. (See cases 
cited in Brannan, pp. 962, 964, supra.) Plaintiff's obligation 
was terminated when defendant accepted the deed in satis-
faction of the notes. The Colorado (Wittman v. Pickens, 33 
Colo. 484 [81 P. 299]), the New Mexico (Hanna v. McCrory, 
19 N.M. 183 [141 P. 996]), and the Montana (First State 
Bank of Hilger v. Lang, 55 Mont. 146 [174 P. 597, 9 A.L.R. 
1139] ), cases, which constitute the sole authority cited for a 
contrary conclusion, actually establish only that delivery of 
the notes is essential if the creditor proposes as a gift to free 
the debtor. 
Thus, even if this were an ordinary civil case where only 
a preponderance of evidence is required, the evidence is in-
sufficient to support the finding that the trust deed indebted-
ness, i.e., the Weiss indebtedness, should be reduced and the 
deed taken as security for the reduced indebtedness, and is 
likewise insufficient to support the contention that Beeler's 
agreement to assume the Weiss indebtedness created an' inde-
pendent contract obligation or that the .cancelled notes re-
mained in effect. This is not an ordinary civil case, however, 
fDr, as the majority opinion concedes, it was incumbent up01i 
plaintiff to support his contention by evidence, "clear, satis-
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factory and convincing; explicit, unequivocal and indispu~ 
able." (Wehle v. Price, 202 Cal. 394, 397 [260 P. 878]; 
Goodfellow v. Goodfellow, 219 Cal. 548, 554 [27 P.2d 898].) 
While it rests primarily with the trial court to determine 
whether the evidence is clear and convincing, its finding is 
not necessarily conclusive, for in cases governed by the rule 
requiring such evidence "the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the finding should be considered by the appellate 
court in the light of that rule." (Sheehan v. Sullivan, 126 
Cal. 189, 193 [58 P. 543] ; see, also Moultrie v. Wright, 154 
Cal. 520 [98 P. 257].) In such cases it is the duty of the ap-
pellate court in reviewing the evidence to determine, not 
whether the trier of facts could reasonably conclude that it 
is more probable that the fact to be proved exists than that 
it does not, as in the ordinary civil case where only a pre-
ponderance of the evidence is required, but whether the trier 
of facts could reasonably conclude that it is highly probable 
that the fact exists. When it holds that the trial court's find-
ing must be governed by the same test with relation to sub-
stantial evidence as ordinarily applies in other civil cases, 
the rule that the evidence must be clear and convincing be-
comes meaningless. There is a contradiction in thus destroy-
ing the vitality of the rule while affirming its soundness. If, 
as in my opinion, the rule is sound, this court has erred in 
its pronouncements (see 25 Cal. Jur. 248; 2 Cal.Jur. 921) 
declining to accept responsibility for its enforcement. (See 
my dissenting opinion in Stromerson v. Averill, 22 Cal.2d 
808, 817 [141 P.2d 732].) 
The doctrine that a deed may be shown to be a mortgage 
was originally an equitable one. It is also to be recalled that 
in equity cases the appellate court would review the facts 
de novo. Although the question whether the evidence estab-
lishes that a deed was intended as a mortgage is now decided 
by the jury in this state (Locke v. Moulton, 108 Cal. 49 [41 
P. 28], see contra, Reilly v. Cullen, 159 Mo. 322 [60 S.W. 
126]) the jury's determination must be supported by clear 
and convincing evidence. It is doubtful whether the rule 
that it is a question for the jury whether a deed was intended 
to be a mortgage would have been adopted without the pro-
tection afforded by the rule requiring the evidence to be clear 
and convincing. Thus, in considering a similar problem with 
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respe~t to"the-reformation of contracts, Judge Cardozo, for 
the New York Court of Appeals, declared: "Juries may 
find it difficult to apply the presumption that preliminary 
treaties are merged in the written contract if they are per-
mitted to consider such treaties as evidence of mistake. 
Against these and like dangers, there are two methods of re-
lief. One is suggested by the provision of the statute that 
'the court in its discretion may order one or more issues to 
be separately tried. . .' The other is found in a strict en-
forcement of the rule that reformat.ion must be refused un-
less the case in support of it is 'of the clearest and most 
satisfactory character.' ... Judgments for reformation have 
been reversed even in this court for failure to obey it." 
(Susquehanna S.s. Co. v. A. O. Andersen &- Co., 239 N.Y. 
285,296 [146 N.E. 381].) 
So grave is the danger that deeds will be erroneously 
found to be mortgages that some states have refused to apply 
the doctrine that a deed may be shown to be a mortgage ex-
cept upon proof of fraud or mistake (see Jackson v. Max-
well, 113 Me. 366, 368 [94 A. 116]), while others have held 
that the doctrine will not be applied unless the grantor's 
testimony is corroborated by indepeYJ.dent testimony. (Stitt 
v. Rat Portage Lttmber Co., 96 Minn. 27, 32 [104 N.W. 561].) 
The solution adopted in this state of requiring clear and 
convincing evidence requires not simply that the appellate 
courts go through the form of recognizing thc rule, but that, 
like the appellate courts of many other states, they accept 
responsibility for its enforcement. (Susquehanna S.S. Co. v. 
A. O. Andersen &- Co., 239 N.Y. 285, 296 [146 N.E. 381] ; 
Allison Bros. Co. v. Allison, 144 N.Y. 21, 33 [38 N.E. 956] ; 
Nevius v. Dunlap, 33 N.Y. 676, 680; Baird v. Baird, 48 Colo. 
506, 517 [111 P. 79]; Rasch v. Rasch, 278 Ill. 261, 271 [115 
N.E. 871] ; Jackson v. Maxwell, 113 Me. 366, 368 [94 A. 116] ; 
Frohlich v. Aikman, 194 Mich. 569, 573 [161 N.W. 867] j 
Baum v. Ward, 131 Ark. 593 [199 S.W. 529] ; Nicolls v. Mc-
Donald, 101 Pa.St. 514; Pancake v. Cattffman, 114 Pa.St. 113 
[7 A. 67] ; Jeffcoat v. Wingard, 110 S.C. 482 [96 S.E. 9081 ; 
Page v. Page, 132 Va. 63 [110 S.E. 370] ; Salas v. Olmos, 47 
N.M.409 [143 P.2d 871, 874].) The United States Supreme 
Court recently reaffirmed its responsibility for enforcement 
of the rule in Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 
124 [63 S.Ot. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796}, where it declared: "For 
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though we assume, without deciding, that in the absence of 
fraud a certificate of naturalization can be set aside under 
§ 15 as 'illegally procured' because of the finding as to at-
tachment [to the principles of the Constitution] would later 
seem to be erroneous, we are of the opinion that this judg-
ment should be reversed. If a finding of attachment can be 
so reconsidered in a denaturalization suit, our decisions make 
it plain that the Government needs more than a bare pre-
ponderance of the evidence to prevail. The remedy afforded 
the Government by the denaturalization statute has been 
said to be a narrower one than that of direct appeal from 
the granting of a petition. Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 
568, 579 [46 S.Ot. 425, 70 L.Ed. 738] ; cf. United States v. 
Ness, 245 U.S. 319, 325 [38 S.Ot. 118,62 L.Ed. 321]. Johan-
nessen v. United States states that a certificate of citizenship 
is 'an instrument granting political privileges and open like 
other public grants to be revoked if and when it shall be 
found to have been unlawfully or fraudulently procured. It 
is in this respect closely analogous to a public grant of land 
, .. ' 225 U.S. 227, 238 [32 S.Ct. 613, 56 L.Ed. 1066]. See 
also Tutun v. United States, supra. To set aside such a grant 
the evidence must be 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing'-
'it cannot be done upon a bare preponderance of evidence 
which leaves the issue in doubt.' Maxwell Land-Grant Case, 
121 U.S. 325, 381 [7 S.Ct. 1015,30 L.Ed. 949] ; United States 
v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 300 [8 S.Ct. 850, 31 
L.Ed. 747]; cf. United States v. Rovin, 12 F.2d 942, 944. 
See Wig'more, Evidence, (3d od.) § 2498. This is so because 
rights once conferred should not be lightly revoked. And 
more especially is this true when the rights are precious and 
when they are conferred by solemn adjudication, as is the 
situation when citizenship is granted. The Government's evi-
dence in this case does not measure up to this exacting 
standard. ' , 
One searches the record in vain for clear and convincing 
evidence that the deed in this case was intended to 'be 'a 
mortgage. The majority opinion relies largely on plaintiff.'s 
testimony. That testimony was impeached, however, beca'use 
of the interest of the plaintiff, and because it was inconsistent 
with his sworn affidavit. The story told was, moreover, an 
incredible one; that purely for hookkeeping purposE'S the 
bank elltered ill to all agreemellt to accept an inarticulated 
fl ;1 
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mortgage in the sum of $60,000 in lieu of a deed of trust 
on real property worth over $135,000 securing an indebted-
ness of $81,232.90. 
Plaintiff's contention rests upon inferences that he seeks 
to elicit from evidence relative to the circumstances under 
which the deed was delivered and to the subsequent conduct 
of the parties. This evidence does not warrant plaintiff's 
inferences. It is described in the majority opinion as "en-
tirely consistent with the view that defendant bank, while 
in fact agreeing on a loan secured by a mortgage, was de-
sirous, for reasons of certain interdepartmental requirements 
connected with its routine bookkeeping procedure, of giving 
the transaction a different appearance by recording it as an 
absolute transfer of title." It is not enough for the evidence 
merely to be consistent with plaintiff's contention, however, 
for it is wholly consistent with the agreement set forth in the 
writings. The burden was on plaintiff to prove that it was 
highly probable that the deed was not what it purported to 
be. He did not sustain this burden by evidence that at best 
is simply consistent with the deed's being something else, 
but which is just as consistent with its being what it pur-
ports to be. (Goodfellow v. Goodfellow, supra; Wehle v. 
Price, supra; Woods v. Jensen, supra.) 
Plaintiff infers from the fact that the $3,000 rental speci-
fied in the lease was equivalent to 5 per cent of the option 
. price of $60,000, that the rental was actually interest, and 
the option price actually an indebtedness. Such a rental is 
bound to be a percentage of the option price and is apt to 
fall within the normal range of interest returns on invest-
ments equivalent to that price. It would be as arbitrary, 
however, to transmute a rental into an interest charge be-
cause it produced the same return as to transmute a dividend 
from stock into interest from a bond. There is nothing in the 
mathematical relation between the two figures that gives any 
clue to what they represent; the substance of the relation-
ship is not found in the sums. It is to the terms of a trans-
action that one must look, and not to the sums involved, since 
transactions may differ widely in nature, however alike may 
be the sums they involve. 
Plaintiff contends that Mr. Kennedy, the bank's repre-
sentative, agreed to have an appraisal made of a tract of 
land that plaintiff owned in Paradise, California, to guide 
! , 
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the bank in taking it in either "to reduce the debt" or "as 
additional security," and infers that if the security was "ad-
ditional" the deed in question was a mortgage. By plaintiff's 
own testimony, however, the conversations regarding the 
Paradise property were concerned with the possibility of de-
fendant's taking it as part of the option price. In the negoti-
ations of September 22nd he asked if defendant would take 
the Paradise property to reduce the indebtedness. Kennedy 
replied that the bank could not do so, but that if plaintitt 
gave the bank the deed and took back a lease and option, the 
latter would examine the property to determine whether it 
would be acceptable as part payment of the option price or 
as additional security for a part thereof. This. suggestion 
obviously contemplated the possibility that the parties Drlght 
later enter into an arrangement enabling plai.ntiff to exercise 
his option by paying only part of the price in cash .. Follow~ 
iug Elberg's visit to the property Kennedy told the plaintiff 
that the bank could not take it outright, but might take it 
as additional security. It cannot reasonably be inferred even 
from plaintiff's own testimony that defendant regarded the 
indebtedness as subsisting and contemplated the Paradise 
property as additional security for that indebtedness rather 
than for the option price. 
Plaintiff relies upon the testimony of his banker, Mr. 
Brown, for support for his contention. Brown merely testi-
:fied, however, that he was present during the :first part of 
the conversation of September 22nd, but left before its con-. 
elusion; that respondent asked for another extension of time; 
that Kennedy replied that back-interest would have to be 
paid up "before any discussion of that sort"; that there was 
some discussion as to whether the deed of trust covered all 
of the property to which plaintiff had title, and that "just 
as I left they had sent for the certificate or for the deed of 
trust. ' , There is nothing in this testimony to suggest that 
defendant agreed to reduce the indebtedness and accept the 
deed as security for the lower amount. 
The exception in the title policy of "any rights of C. W. 
Beeler who is in possession" is invoked to uphold the con-
tention that the deed was simply a mortgage. It was de-
fendant's lease and option, however, that necessitated this 
exception. Before the transaction was closed, defendant was 
advised by Mr. McGlyn, an officer of the Tehama County 
1\lli 
!\I; 
Ii 1; I ., 
! 
I 
; \.:. 
I 
38, BEELER v. AMERICAN TRUST CO. [24 C.2d 
Title Company,' that- plaintiff's affidavit put an end to his 
iiiterest in the property. Plaintiff replied that he had an 
option. McGlyn later advised the Title Insurance and Guar-
antee Company by telephone that defendant had a lease and 
option and would remain in possession of the property, and 
that company thereupon obtained defendant's confirmation 
of these facts and its consent to the exception in the title 
policy. 
No support for plaintiff's contention can be found in the 
discussion regarding the sixty-dollar internal revenue stamp. 
The stamp was already on the deed and the title company 
had been instructed to bill defendant for its cost so there is 
no reason why McGlyn should have asked plaintiff whether 
he refused to put the stamp on. In any event whatever views 
plaintiff may have expressed to McGlyn about the deed's 
being merely a means of refinancing, there is no claim that 
he communicated his views to defendant. (See Brant v .. Oali-
fornia Dairies, Inc., 4 Cal.2d 128 [48 P.2d 13].) 
Plaintiff relies heavily upon the finding of the trial court 
that when the deed in question was executed, the property 
had a market value of more than $135,000, and a rental value 
of more than $7,500, figures that substantially exceeded the 
option price and the rental fixed in the lease. Such an excess 
in conjunction with other circumstances is often indicative 
of a: security transaction, for the greater the valuation in re-
lation to the indebtedness, the more unlikely the owner is to 
sell the property to cancel the indebtedness. In this case, 
however, the parties themselves, whose valuations alone are 
pertinent (Tetenman v. Epstein, 66 Cal.App. 745 [226 P. 
966]), did not attach so high a value to the property. Even 
if they had, it is inconceivable that the bank would volun-
tarily have reduced an indebtedness so amply secured, and 
l'elinquished, to its own disadvantage, a deed of trust for 
~uch a mortgage. (See Robinson v. Barnard, 5 Cal.App.2d 
:196,400 [42 P.2d 711].) 
There is nothing in the evidence of conduct subsequent 
\0 the transaction to establish that the deed was taken as 
liecurity rather than in satisfaction of the indebtedness, or 
that plaintiff had anything more than a lease and an option. 
Plaintiff's repair of the fences and removal of the walnut 
trees following the flood of the Sacramento River in 1937 do 
not signify that the bank regarded him as the owner of the 
~ ~ 
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property. He was bound by the terms of his lease to repair 
the fences, and he removed the walnut trees only after ob-
taining defendant's consent. Even if the improvements were 
more extensive than the lease required they do not signify 
ownership, for they would redound to the advantage of the 
plaintiff if he exercised the option. The evidence of the leases 
by the plaintiff likewise fails to establish him as the owner 
of the property, for his lease from the bank permitted him 
to make subleases, and it was a matter of indifference to the 
bank whether the instruments executed by the plaintiff and 
his lessees took the form of leases rather than subleases. 
Even assuming that a debt still existed, and that the deed 
was intended to secure it, there is no evidence that the debt 
was $60,000 and not $81,232.90, the amount due when 'the 
deed was executed. It is contended that it was agreed that 
the debt should thus be reduced at the conference between 
plaintiff and the bank officials. Plaintiff, however, testified 
without contradiction that it was then agreed, that the notes 
be cancelled. Following the conference, the deed, the lease 
containing the option, and the affidavit were executed as 
formal memorials of the agreement then made. While parol 
evidence is admissible to show that a deed is a mortgage, it 
is not admissible to vary the terms of a written contract so 
as to transform it from a complete to a partial cancellation. 
(Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 1856; see 10 Cal.Jur. 916, 924.) The 
majority opinion holds that the notes were not discharged, 
because they were not delivered to Weiss or to plaintiff. Yet 
the larger note was cancelled, the smaller one was written 
off as a loss, and satisfaction of both was recorded pursuant 
to the understanding of plaintiff and defendant. Despite 
these facts it is held that without delivery of any note, the 
debt is reduced to $60,000, the amount of the larger note. It 
is pertinent to inquire how the smaller note is then discharged 
without delivery. 
Moreover, the supposed agreement to release plaintiff from 
a liability of over $21,000 was clearly without consideration 
and is unenforceable. (Scheeline v. Moshier, 172 Cal. 565 
[158 P. 222]; see 6 Cal.Jur. 179.) If the deed was given 
merely as security it represented less than defendant already 
had. The deed of trust contained the usual power of sale and 
other provisions for defendant's protection and was not sub-
ject to the 1933 amendments restricting the right to judg-
\1 
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ment for a deficiency. (Cal. Civ. Code, § 2924%; Cal. Code 
Civ. Proc., § 580(a).) Regarded as security, the deed was 
less advantageous to defendant, less burdensome to plain-
tiff. It conferred no power of sale and would have to be fore-
closed by court proceedings, thereby leaving plaintiff with a 
right to redeem. It contained no provisions for defendant's 
protection and was subject to the 1933 amendments. As se-
curity, therefore, the deed, far from being of advantage to 
the defendant, was of advantage to plaintiff. Since the al-
leged agreement was oral, and it appeared upon the face of 
the complaint that there was no consideration, a special plei!-
by defendant of lack of consideration was unnecessary. 
(Acheson v. Western Union Tel. 00.,96 Cal. 641 [31 P. 583]; 
see 2 Cal.Jur. 257.) 
[Sac. No. 5506. In Bank. Apr. 3,1944.] 
STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA (a Cor-
poration), Respondent, v. CHARLES G. JOHNSON, 
as Treasurer, etc., Appellant. 
[1] Sales-Passage of Title-Delivery to Carrier-F. O. B. Ship-
ments.-Whether or not the seller's delivery of personal prop-
erty to a carrier constitutes delivery to the buyer depends on 
the intention of the parties as ascertained from the contract of 
sale and other circumstances of the case. Ordinarily, unless a 
contrary intent appears, where tile seller contracts to deliver 
goods at a given destination and he delivers them to a carrier 
consigned to the buyer with freight charges paid by the seller 
(f.o.b. point of destination), the delivery to the carrier does 
not constitute delivery to the buyer and title does not pass until 
the goods have arrived at their destination. 
[2] Id.-Passage of Title-Delivery to Carrier-Where Carrier is 
Buyer.-The mere fact that the railroad which received ship-
ments of fuel oil in California to be transported outside the 
state was also the buyer of the oil did not show that there was 
[1] F.o.b. provision in sale contract as affecting time or place of 
passage of title, notes, 101 A.L.R. 292. See, also, 22 Cal.Jur. 949, 
953; 46 Am.Jur. 349-350, 609. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,2,4,5] Sales, §97(7); [3] Carriers, 
§ 18; [6] Carriers, § 24; [7] CommercII, § 8. 
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necessarily an actual delivery in the state to the railroad as 
buyer instead of a delivery to it in its capacity as a common 
carrier. 
[3] Carriers-Property-Duty to Carry.-A railroad as a common 
carrier is required to accept all goods tendered to it for 
carriage that it is able to carry, and it cannot legally refuse to 
carry goods as property of the shipper if the goods are tendered 
to it for this purpose. 
[4] Sales - Passage of Title - Delivery to Carrier - Intent of 
Parties.-Where a contract of sale of fuel oil to a railroad re-
quired the seller to fill the railroad's requisitions by deliveries 
at the places therein specified, and the oil was delivered to the 
railroad, and was shipped to out-of-state destinations under 
standard bills of lading with the buyer named as consignee and 
with freight charges prepaid by the seller (f.o.b. such destina-
tions), it was intended that the railroad in its capacity as com-
mon carrier should receive the oil at the point of shipment as 
property of the seller, and that delivery to the railroad as 
buyer should not take place until the oil arrived at its destina-
tion outside the state. 
[5] Id.-Passage of Title-Delivery to Carrier-F.O.B. Shipments. 
-The terms of an amended contract of sale of fuel oil to a rail-
road and the form of shipping documents naming the buyer as 
consignee were not to be disregarded on the ground that the 
purpose of making the delivery f.o.b. destination outside the 
state instead of, as in the original contract, f.o.b. the tank cars 
was to avoid the payment of sales taxes to the state, where, 
although the freight charges prepaid by the seller under the 
amended contract were added to the sales price, the seller was 
deprived of the use of the money paid for freight until the oil 
was paid for by the buyer, and where, under that contract, risk 
of loss during transportation was on the seller, as owner, rather 
than the buyer. 
[6] Carriers-Property-Liability for Loss or Injury.-Civ. Code, 
§§ 2194, 2195, do not make the carrier an insurer against all 
losses of property entrusted to it; and risk of loss from such 
causes as acts of a public enemy, acts "of the law," and any 
"irresistible superhuman cause," remains with the owner of 
the property. 
[7] Commerce-Taxation-Intrastate Transactions.-Where fuel 
oil was sold to a railroad under a contract requiring the seller 
to fill the railroad's requisitions by deliveries at designated 
points outside the state, and where the oil loaded into tank 
cars of the railroad within the state was transported to destina-
[7] See 24 Cal.Jur. 135 j 26 R.C.L. 86, 120. 
